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Rhesus Monkeys Attribute Perceptions to Others
direction of gaze to determine what that individual canJonathan I. Flombaum* and Laurie R. Santos
Department of Psychology and cannot see. Our work builds on the recent insight
Yale University that primates will most likely exhibit sophisticated ToM
New Haven, CT 06520 abilities in experimental scenarios that mimic the natural
situations for which these abilities have evolved—
namely, competitive foraging situations [16, 17]. Despite
robust failures in previous ToM tasks [1–2, 18], chimpan-Summary
zees have succeeded in reasoning about another indi-
vidual’s potential visual knowledge when vying for foodParamount among human cognitive abilities is the ca-
in competitive interactions [6, 19]. Results like thesepacity to reason about what others think, want, and
raise the possibility that macaques (as well as othersee—a capacity referred to as a theory of mind (ToM).
monkey species [20]) may possess a similar ability and,Despite its importance in human cognition, the extent
therefore, that gaze-sensitive neurons in macaque cor-to which other primates share human ToM capacities
tex may support sophisticated ToM reasoning.has for decades remained amystery. To date, primates
In the present six experiments, we ask whether free-[1, 2] have performed poorly in behavioral tasks that
ranging rhesus monkeys from the Cayo Santiago popu-require ToM abilities, despite the fact that some ma-
lation reason about what a human competitor can andcaques are known to encode social stimuli at the level
cannot see. Themonkeys in this population are naturallyof single neurons [3–5]. Here, we presented rhesus
curious about the foods that human experimenters bringmacaques with a more ecologically relevant ToM task
to the island [21] and occasionally try to obtain theseinwhich subjects could “steal” a contested grape from
foods, even though they are also somewhat apprehen-one of two human competitors. In six experiments,
sive of getting close to humans. We presented subjectsmonkeys selectively retrieved the grape from an ex-
with the opportunity to take a grape from one of twoperimenter who was incapable of seeing the grape
human “competitors” (Figure 1). We reasoned that sub-rather than an experimenter who was visually aware.
jects should be motivated to take the grape only whenThese results suggest that rhesus macaques possess
they can do so without being detected. We thus pre-an essential component of ToM: the ability to deduce
dicted that subjects would spontaneously use informa-what others perceive on the basis of where they are
looking. These results converge with new findings il- tion aboutwhere the twocompetitorswere lookingwhen
lustrating the importance of competitive paradigms in deciding which of the two competitors to approach.
apes [6]. Moreover, they raise the possibility that, in In particular, subjects should selectively approach the
primates, cortical cells thought to encode where oth- competitor whose gaze is directed away from the con-
ers are looking [7] may encode what those individuals tested grape or whose view of the grape is otherwise
see as well. occluded. Success in this situation involves more than
mere gaze following; subjects must spontaneously use
information about the direction of an individual’s gazeResults and Discussion
to make a task-relevant decision.
In the first experiment, we allowed subjects to chooseIn a number of pioneering studies, neurophysiologists
between two competitors who differed in their overallinvestigating macaque temporal cortex have identified
body orientation: one with his entire body facing awaycells that represent the direction of other individuals’
from the grape, the other facing toward the grape. Sub-gazes in enough detail to determinewhere those individ-
jects reliably approached the competitor whose backuals are looking (and potentially what they see) [7, 8].
was facing the contested grape (binomial probability:To date, however, the specific cognitive abilities sub-
served by these gaze-sensitive neurons remain unclear p  0.0001; Figure 1A). This finding suggests that ma-
[9]. Although macaques spontaneously attend to and caqueswill take into account differences in the competi-
follow the gaze of others [10–14], they appear unable tors’ positions when choosing which grape to approach
to use this information to reason about what other indi- and, moreover, that they do so partly on the basis of
viduals see and know [15]. Therefore, gaze-sensitive what each individual can see. We then explored whether
cells may only support the capacity to respond to the this result was simply due to a general avoidance of the
direction of other individuals’ gazes without necessarily experimenter who was facing forward. In experiment
representing their mental states (i.e., what they see), two, the competitors placed their platforms down to
a capacity that is importantly different from our own their sides, rather than in front of them. Subjects there-
species’s ToM abilities. fore had to choose between a competitor who was fac-
Here, we provide the first behavioral evidence that rhe- ing 90 to the side and staring at the platform or to
sus macaques detect more than simply where another approach a competitor who was facing 90 to the side
individual’s eyes are oriented. In particular, we suggest but with his back to the platform. Even though both
that rhesusmacaques are able to use another individual’s experimenters revealed only their profile in this experi-
ment, subjects reliably approached the experimenter
with his back to the platform rather than the one with*Correspondence: jonathan.flombaum@yale.edu
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Figure 1. The Experimental Setup and Results of Experiments One (A) and Two (B)
Subjects were allowed to approach the grape in front of one of the two competitors while two camerapersons filmed them.
his front to the platform (experiment two: p  0.001; different question about rhesus monkeys’ knowledge of
visual perception. Specifically, we considered whetherFigure 1B).
We next explored whether macaques also take into monkeys take into account the presence of a visual
barrier when competing with human experimenters foraccount more subtle cues to where a person is looking.
In the next two studies, subjects selectively retrieved contested grapes. Experiment four proceeded as the
previous experiments did except that both competitorsthe grape from a competitor whose head and eyes were
oriented 90 away (experiment three: p 0.0001; Figure in this experiment carried a large opaque barrier (20 
80 cm). One competitor held this barrier horizontally in2A) and also from a competitor whose eyes alone were
oriented 45 to the side (experiment four: p  0.008; front of his body. Although the barrier blocked a large
portion of the competitor’s body, it did not block hisFigure 2B). Taken together, these four experiments dem-
onstrate that rhesus monkeys spontaneously and suc- eyes. The other competitor held the barrier vertically in
front of his body so that it blocked his face and eyes.cessfully employ information about the competitors’
eyes when deciding which grape to approach. Even Unlike the horizontal barrier, this vertical barrier served
as a visual occluder, preventing this competitor fromwithout training, our subjects knew to attend to the spe-
cific feature of the competitors’ posture that determined seeing the grape. We predicted that subjects should
selectively approach the competitor with his face andwhat they could and could not see: the direction of their
eyes. Although this result differs from previous findings eyes blocked if and only if they understand the nature
of visual occlusion. As predicted, subjects reliably ap-with macaques in noncompetitive behavioral situations
[15], it is consistent with neurophysiological work sug- proached the grape in front of the experimenter whose
eyes were blocked by the vertical barrier (p  0.01;gesting that macaques have cells devoted to detecting
(and therefore potentially using) gaze direction irrespec- Figure 2C). Subjects show a similar effect with smaller
visual barriers—they selectively approach an experi-tive of head and body orientation [7].
In the final two experiments, we explored a slightly menter with a small (6  20 cm) barrier in front of his
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Figure 2. Results of Experiments Three through Six (A–D)
In each experiment, significantly more subjects (p values reflect binomial probabilities) retrieved grapes from the competitor who was unable
to see them rather than the one who could.
eyes instead of one with an identical barrier in front of Our experiments add to this growing literature by ex-
tending this approach to a non-ape species—in particu-his mouth (experiment five: p  0.002; Figure 2D).
lar, one used as a neuroscientific model. In addition, the
methods developed here bear several advantages for
Conclusions
the further study of ToM abilities in primates. First, these
Across the six experiments presented above, rhesus
methods allow for study of naive populations and with
monkeys correctly use information about what a com-
the use of only a single experimental trial per individual.
petitor can and cannot see in order to retrieve a con- Consequently, they reflect abilities that are available to
tested piece of food. Because the monkeys in these the subject spontaneously and in the absence of train-
experiments must selectively avoid the experimenter ing. Further, by employing human competitors as op-
who could potentially see the contested food item, it is posed to conspecifics, these methods afford an oppor-
difficult to interpret these results in terms of a simple tunity to manipulate very subtle and specific cues to
mechanism for responding to the gaze of another indi- visual knowledge (e.g., holding a barrier over the eyes
vidual without representing that individual’s percep- versus holding a barrier in front of the mouth) and,
tions. The animals in these studies needed to first repre- thereby, the ability to programmatically dissect the cog-
sent what the two competitors could and could not see, nitive mechanisms of mental-state attribution.
and then to make a choice, based on this knowledge, to There is, however, at least one deflationary account
approach the experimenter who was not visually aware. of these results: Subjects may have performed success-
Consequently, beyond demonstrating that rhesus mon- fully without reasoning about the mental states of their
keys are sensitive to eye-gaze direction, these experi- human competitors simply by, as a rule, avoiding the
ments constitute the first evidence that a non-ape spe- experimenter looking forward. It is worth considering
cies spontaneously reasons about another individual’s such an account carefully, in various incarnations, in
visual perception. part because it leads to some introspection about the
To anyone familiar with rhesus monkeys’ natural be- nature of our own ToM abilities: Would a human partici-
havior, our subjects’ performance in these studies may pant presented with a similar problem solve this task
appear unsurprising. However, our subjects’ perfor- by doing more than merely avoiding the experimenter
mance is actually quite remarkable when considered in looking forward? In its simplest form, such an account
light of previous experimental studies of ToM in pri- of our results might appeal to the fact that rhesus mon-
mates. In these previous studies, rhesus macaques and keys, as well as many other primates, view direct gaze
other primates have systematically failed to use informa- as threatening [35]. Perhaps, then, subjects avoided the
tion about visual perception. Specifically, in object- experimenter facing straight ahead simply because that
choice paradigms, wherein an experimenter attempts individual looked more threatening. Such an account
to communicate the location of a hidden food by either seems unlikely in light of the findings in experiments four
orienting toward its location or gesturing at it, monkeys through six; in these studies, both competitors faced
and apes have been unable to correctly read and use directly forward, and only a slight deviation of their eyes,
eye gaze in the absence of explicit training ([15, 22–29]; or the presence of an occluder blocking their eyes, dis-
but see [30] for successes in dogs). We hypothesize tinguishedwhich of the twocompetitors could andcould
that our paradigmbetter approximates the normal social not see. Moreover, in experiment two, both competitors
conditions in which primates naturally use visual per- stood sideways in relation to the subject—that is, with
ception and therefore is a better method for eliciting this their profile facing the monkey. Even though neither
type of reasoning in a controlled experimental context competitor faced forward, subjects nonetheless ap-
[16–17, 31]. Several recent studies have successfully proached only the competitor who was not looking at
applied this logic to developing paradigms for studying the food. Subjects therefore choose on the basis of what
each competitor can and cannot see, even when theirmental-state attribution in chimpanzees [6, 19, 32–33].
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overall demeanor is equally threatening. For these rea- not only detect eye-gaze orientation in others but also
use this information in a socially relevant way, thesesons, we conclude that subjects did not show success-
ful performance simply because they found one of the experiments begin to forge a link between the cognitive
systems responsible for social reasoning and their neu-postures more threatening than the other.
It is still possible, however, that subjects succeeded ral substrates. Our data suggest that this species not
only identifies where other individuals are looking, butin these experiments not because theyweremoreor less
threatened, but also not throughmental-state attribution also what they see. Although reasoning about the per-
ceptions of others is only one form of mental-state attri-per se. Instead, subjects may have succeeded through
the application of a simple nonmentalistic rule: Avoid bution and thus only one component of the broad suite
ofmechanisms involved in reasoning about otherminds,the experimenter whose posture makes him more likely
to react to your approach [17–18, 36]. Note that a rule it appears to be a form of reasoning available spontane-
ously to the very species used in neurophysiologicalsuch as this one could potentially explain any ToM-
like behavior without the explicit representation of the investigations of social cognition.With behavioral meth-
ods that single out these abilities and an understandingmental state of another individual. For example, in ex-
periment one, the monkeys may approach the experi- of potential neurophysiological substrates, we are poised
to begin teasing apart subtly different aspects of ToM,menter whose back is facing them not by representing
“His back is toward me; therefore, he cannot see me or both cognitively and neurally, in an animal model.
One outstanding question in the study of human ToMthe grape” but by representing “His back is toward me;
therefore, he probably will not respond as I approach.” abilities, for instance, concerns the role that the amyg-
dala plays in reasoning about perception and gaze [37].Indeed, some researchers argue that no experiments
like the ones presented here could ever unconfound The amygdala is known to show sensitivity to the direc-
tion of another individual’s gaze [38], but it tends tothese two kinds of interpretations [36].
We would like to argue that, in this context, applying respond to gaze information with a slightly longer la-
tency than other areas, such as the superior temporalsuch a rule successfully is precisely the point and, in-
deed, qualifies as reasoning about the perceptions of sulcus (STS) [39]. Moreover, it is known that damage
to the amygdala results in a generalized impairmentothers. This is because such rules should not apply
successfully in all contexts. Avoiding the experimenter in reasoning about both visual perception and mental
states [40, 41]. Because the amygdala is known to bindlooking forward works in a competitive foraging situa-
tion, but the same rule would not work for choosing emotional content with sensory information, some have
hypothesized that the amygdala may provide the criticalamong potential mating partners, for example, where
an organism would be ill-served by a rule to always link in reasoning about what others see in addition to
where they are looking [3, 4]. That is, perhaps the STSapproach conspecifics who could not see them or will
probably not respond to them. Thus, it is the process is largely responsible for analyzing where another indi-
vidual’s eyes are spatially “pointing,” independent of theof applying the correct rule in the correct situation that
qualifies the behaviors observed here as involving a orientation of the rest of their body, whereas the amygdala
may instead be responsible for using this information toToM. The monkeys that we tested had to first under-
stand that where competitors look constrains what they figure out what that individual sees [9]. Our behavioral
paradigm is sensitive enough to investigate this hypoth-can potentially see in order to then conclude that the
competitor looking straight ahead is the one to avoid—it esis if it is used in conjunction with lesioning techniques,
and this typeof cellular-level cognitive neurosciencecouldis, after all, the fact that one competitor cannot see the
monkey and the grape in front of him that renders him potentially help us to better understand fundamental so-
cial-cognitive mechanisms that appear to be disrupted inunlikely to react to the monkey’s approach. In experi-
ments four and six, moreover, the monkeys that we disorders such as autism and schizophrenia.
The success of the experiments presented here istested revealed an appreciation of how one’s eyes, spe-
cifically, are the most relevant factors in determining surely due in part to the fact that they mimic the socio-
cognitive problems that primates naturally face in thewhich competitor is best to avoid. It is not clear, then,
howmeaningful the distinction becomesbetween repre- wild. Specifically, they explore what primates know
about the eyes of others through competitive foragingsenting “His eyes render him unable to see the grape”
in comparison to representing “his eyes render him un- situations. Such naturalistic paradigms have already
provided comparative psychologists with a better win-likely to approach the grape.”Of course, a human partic-
ipating as a subject in these experiments could certainly dow on primate sociocognitive abilities by demonstra-
ting that primates possess cognitive capacities thatrepresent the situation in eitherway, andwould probably
do much more. In addition to representing the content were once thought to be unique to the human species
[17]. We propose that a similar approach will eventuallyof a competitor’s perceptions, a human might use the
position of a competitor’s eyes to determine what the provide neuroscientists with a clearer window on the
neural structure of ToM. In addition to providing a pri-competitor plans on doing or what he or she desires,
or even to evaluate the accuracy of his or her knowledge. mate model for ToM systems, a more ecological ap-
proachmay yield insight into how human sociocognitiveHowever, none of these sophisticated processes could
occur unless the organism first has an understanding systemshave evolvedand, in particular, the evolutionary
contexts for which our human ToM was designed [42].of howother individuals’ directionof eyegazeconstrains
what they see, an ability that we appear to share with Our hope is that evolutionary insights into the function
of these systems may serve to constrain hypothesesrhesus monkeys.
By identifying mechanisms in rhesus monkeys that about how these systems are organized at a neural level.
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Experimental Procedures Experiment Two
Twenty adult rhesus monkeys were successfully tested; 75 other
subjects were approached by the experimenters but did not contrib-Subjects
We tested free-ranging rhesus monkeys, Macaca mulatta, living on ute to the analysis because of interference, experimenter error, or
previous testing. This study was nearly identical to experiment one,the island of Cayo Santiago. The Cayo Santiago field site is run
and maintained by the Caribbean Primate Research Center and the except for the placement of the platforms and the position of the
competitors. In this study, when cameraperson two called “Down,”University of Puerto Rico. The current population consists of 1000
individuals divided into approximately eight social groups. Each each competitor placed his platform down to his side, rather than
in front of him. Therefore, from the subject’s perspective, the grapesubject has a distinctive set of ear notches and chest tattoos and
therefore can be easily identified. Cayo Santiago staff provision platformswere not positioned between the subject and the competi-
tors, but rather were placed to the side of the competitors. Oncesubjects with monkey chow at three feeding stations; subjects also
eat a variety of foods on the island; these foods include leaves, the platformswere placed down and cameraperson two called “Up,”
both competitors turned 90 in relation to the subject and, thus,flowers, small plants, and soil. Subjects also have occasional access
to the food that humans consume on the island [21]. The staff pro- faced the platforms. Cameraperson two then called “Turn,” and
one competitor turned 180 to the side. In this final position, thevides subjects with ad libitum access to water at a number of
competitor that turned stood with his back toward the grape whilesources. The individuals in this population have served as research
the other stood facing his grape; note that in this position, bothsubjects for nearly 70 years. For this reason, subjects are well-
competitors revealed only their profile to the subject. After the com-habituated to human observers. In addition, we have successfully
petitors were in position, cameraperson one called “Start” and al-tested this population on similar cognitive experiments for the past
lowed the subject 1 min to approach one of the two competitors.10 years (e.g., [21]).
Experiment Three
Eighteen adult rhesus monkeys were tested successfully; 75 otherApparatus and Procedure
subjects were approached but did not contribute to the analysisFour experimenters performed the experiments. The first two acted
because of interference, experimenter error, previous testing, earlyas the competitors (competitor one and competitor two), presenting
approach, or disinterest. In this study, we presented subjects withsubjects with grapes mounted on square foamcore platforms (200
a choice between a competitor whose eyes and head were facing
cm2). The two male experimenters who served as competitors wore
forward and one whose eyes and head were facing 90 to the side.
the same clothes (a white shirt, green shorts, and a white hat) and
Experiment three proceeded as described in the Apparatus and
were matched for approximate height and build. The other two
Procedure section. After the competitors had placed their platforms
experimenters filmed the interaction (cameraperson one and cam-
on the ground, cameraperson two said “Turn,” and one of the two
eraperson two) with Sony Digital-8 cameras. Cameraperson two
competitors turned his head and eyes 90 from the platform. After
also served as the coordinator, verbally instructing the competitors
the competitor completed his head turn, cameraperson one called
throughout the presentation. These verbal instructions served to “Start” and allowed the subject 1 min to approach one of the two
synchronize the timing of competitors’ movements throughout the competitors.
presentation. Experiment Four
As in previous studies [21], experimenters chose subjects oppor- Twenty-two adult rhesus monkeys were tested successfully; 51
tunistically, selecting animals that were seated alone in a clear area. other subjects were approached but did not contribute to the analy-
Cameraperson one approached the subject from behind and filmed sis because of interference, experimenter error, or previous testing.
the actions of the competitors from approximately 3 m away. Cam- In this study, we presented subjects with a choice between a com-
eraperson two and the competitors approached the subject from petitor whose eyes faced forward and one whose eyes were facing
the front and stopped 2–3 m away. Once all experimenters were in 45 to the side. Each session of experiment four proceeded as
position, cameraperson two began the presentation (see Figure 1). described in the Apparatus and Procedure section. After the com-
He first instructed the competitors to take a grape (“Take”) that he petitors had placed their platforms on the ground, cameraperson
was holding. The competitors then immediately took their grapes two said “Turn,” and one of the two competitors turned his eyes
and held them up for subjects to see. At this time, cameraperson 45 from the platform. After the competitor’s eyes were in position,
twowalked 1–2m back, so that he was 4–5m away from the subject. cameraperson one called “Start” and allowed the subject 1 min to
Once in position, cameraperson two instructed the competitors to approach one of the two competitors.
affix their grapes onto the platforms (“Kebab”), step 1 m to either Experiment Five
side (“Step”), bend over and place the platforms on the ground Sixteen adult rhesus monkeys were tested successfully; 37 other
(“Down”), and stand back up (“Up”). He then instructed the competi- subjects were approached but did not contribute to the analysis
tors to assume the final position described specifically for each because of interference, experimenter error, or previous testing.
experiment below (“Turn”). Once the competitors turned to their Experiment five presented subjects with a choice between a com-
new position, cameraperson one called “Start,” and subjects were petitor holding a barrier (20  80 cm) horizontally in front of his
given 1 min to approach one of the two grapes. Cameraperson one body and one holding a similar barrier vertically in front of his chest
coded the first grape touched as the subject’s choice. Subjects who and face. Experiment five proceeded as described in the Apparatus
failed to approach within 1 min were omitted from the final analysis. and Procedure section, with a few slight changes. After the competi-
We also omitted trials in which another individual interfered with tors had stood up after placing their platforms on the ground, cam-
the subject’s approach and those in which the subject approached eraperson two said “Clutch,” and both competitors grabbed their
before the end of the presentation. Video recordings of all sessions barriers. After they had their barriers in hand, cameraperson two
were digitized and scored offline by both authors. called “Turn,” and both competitors turned their barriers in unison,
Experiment One one turning it vertically in front of his face and chest, the other
Eighteen adult rhesus monkeys were successfully tested; 21 other turning it horizontally in front of his chest. After the competitors
subjects were approached by the experimenters but did not contrib- finished turning their barriers, cameraperson one called “Start” and
ute to the analysis because of interference, experimenter error, pre- allowed the subject 1 min to approach one of the two competitors.
vious testing, or early approach detected during offline coding. In Experiment Six
this study, we presented subjects with a choice between a competi- Nineteen adult rhesus monkeys were tested successfully; 44 other
tor whose eyes, head, and body were facing forward and one whose subjects were approached but did not contribute to the analysis
eyes, head, andbodywere facing 180 away. Each session of experi- because of interference, experimenter error, or previous testing.
ment one proceeded as described in the Apparatus and Procedure Experiment six presented subjectswith a choice between a compet-
section. After the competitors had placed their platforms on the itor holding a small barrier (6  20 cm) horizontally in front of his
ground, cameraperson twosaid “Turn,” andoneof the twocompetitors eyes and one holding a similar barrier horizontally in front of his
turned his eyes, body, and head 180 from the platform. After the mouth. Experiment six proceeded in the same way as experiment
competitor completed his turn, cameraperson one called “Start” and five. After the competitors had stood up after placing their platforms
on the ground, cameraperson two said “Clutch,” and both competi-allowed the subject 1 min to approach one of the two competitors.
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tors grabbed their barriers. After they had their barriers in hand, 17. Tomasello,M., Call, J., and Hare, B. (2003). Chimpanzees under-
stand psychological states—the question is which ones and tocameraperson two called “Turn,” and each of the competitors moved
what extent. Trends. Cogn. Sci. 7, 153–156.their barriers in unison, one placing it horizontally in front of his eyes,
18. Povinelli, D.J., and Bering, J.M. (2002). The mentality of apesthe other placing it horizontally in front of his mouth. After the competi-
revisited. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 11, 115–119.tors were in position, cameraperson one called “Start” and allowed
19. Hare, B., Call, J., and Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzeesthe subject 1 min to approach one of the two competitors.
know what conspecifics know? Anim. Behav. 61, 139–151.
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